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Compelling Disclosure by a Non-Party Litigant
in Violation of Foreign Bank Secrecy Laws:
Recent Developments in Canada-United States
Relations

INTRODUCTION

T

HE QUESTION WHETHER

Canadian or American courts should

enforce their laws in a manner that respects the laws of friendly
sovereign states has recently been examined by the Supreme Court
of Canada and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. Their decisions will be the object of this note in the light of
recent developments in Canada-United States relations in the area of
legal assistance in civil and criminal matters.
Often our courts are asked to compel a person not a party to the
litigation or investigation to produce documents or give evidence in
Canada when to do so might or does constitute a criminal offence
where the information originated or must be obtained. How can the
witness choose between the conflicting commands of two states? Does
the principle of equality of states demand that these conflicting
commands be given equal weight so that the witness will not be
penalized if he or she obeys one or the other or should the lex fori
always prevail, especially in criminal matters, in order not to frustrate the administration of justice in Canada? Are there other ways
to resolve this dilemma which respect international law principles?
More generally, to what extent is the foreign state compulsion defence available in a Canadian or American civil or criminal trial?
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In Spencer v. R.,' the Supreme Court of Canada in a unanimous
decision was of the opinion that a Canadian citizen employee of the
1 Oct. 1o, 1985, file 17603, not yet reported, affirming (1983)

145 D.L.R.
(3d) 344, 2 C.C.C. (3d) 526 (C.A.) setting aside a decision of a judge
of the Supreme Court of Ontario (1982) 8 W.C.B. i i i which had quashed

a decision of a Provincial Court judge ordering the witness to testify.
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Royal Bank of Canada who, while now a resident of Canada, was
at the relevant time the bank manager for a branch in the Bahamas
could not refuse to answer questions when subpoenaed as a witness
by the Crown at the trial in Canada of an accused charged with
evading Canadian income taxes, concerning transactions by the
accused at that branch, on the ground that disclosure of the information requested could expose him to a criminal prosecution in the
Bahamas.
The relevant Bahamian legislation 2 provides that a bank employee
shall not, without the express or implied consent of the customer
concerned, disclose to any person any information relating to the
identity, assets, liabilities, transactions, or accounts of a customer.
Every person who contravenes this legislation is guilty of an offence
and is liable on summary conviction to a fine or to a term of imprisonment or to both.
The Supreme Court of Canada considered the issue of the compellability of a witness in a Canadian court from the point of view
of the liberty and security of the person provision of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 and from the point of view of
public and private international law principles.
With respect to the Charter, it is sufficient to say that the court
was of the opinion that the infringement of liberty or security, if any,
did not result from the application of Canadian law but solely from
that of Bahamian law in the Bahamas. Thus, the Charter has no
extraterritorial effect.
From the point of view of public and private international law
principles, the Supreme Court of Canada felt that the principle of
sovereign equality of states as applied to the Bahamas had not been
violated. On the contrary, to have given effect to the laws of that
state by allowing the witness to refuse to testify with impunity would
have constituted a violation of Canadian sovereignty since the result
would have been the frustration of the administration of justice in
Canada in respect of a Canadian citizen in relation to an essentially
domestic situation. The court was of the opinion that Canada's
interest in enforcing its taxation laws must take priority over the
interest of the Bahamas to ensure for its own public policy reasons
the confidentiality of banking transactions.
2

See s. 1o of the Bank and Trust Companies Regulations Act, 1965, 1965
Bah. Acts, No. 64, as am. by Bank and Trust Companies Regulations
(Amendment) Act, ig8o, i98o Bah. Acts. No. 3.

3 Constitution Act 1982, Schedule B of Canada Act, 1982, c.

II

(U.K.), s. 7.

Notes and Comments
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Estey adopted a more conciliatory view with respect to the method to be followed when he
declared that international comity dictates that orders to compel
a witness to give evidence should not be made lightly when they
result in a violation or an unnecessary circumvention of the laws or
procedures of a friendly foreign state. He pointed out that in such
cases a preferable method would be to grant a stay of proceedings
at the trial level to allow the witness sufficient time to apply to the
foreign court for an order permitting disclosure which would exempt
him or her from criminal liability. Only where such an order had
not been sought or obtained within a reasonable period of time
would the Canadian trial court have the power to compel the
witness.'
Mr. Justice LaForest in his opinion specifically approved the
reasons given by the Ontario Court of Appeal, which relied on public and private international law principles.
The Court of Appeal stated that whether or not a person is a
compellable witness is a question which must be characterized as a
matter of procedure governed by the lex fori. The fact that Bahamian law prohibited the witness from testifying was irrelevant. Even
if compellability had been characterized as a matter of substance,
still public and private international law hold that the courts of one
state are not bound to recognize and enforce the criminal laws and
judgments of another state.' This principle is based primarily on
the territorial nature of the criminal law as the expression of the
public policy of the enacting state.! The answer would have been
the same if the Bahamas had given its Banks and Trusts Companies
Regulation Act an extraterritorial effect, as a distinction is made
between the capacity of the state under international law to prescribe
4

Supra note i.

• S. io( i) (iii) of the Bahamian law, supra note 2, to that effect except with
respect to tax matters.
6 Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1986), para. 88; Williams and
Castel, Canadian Criminal Law: International and Transnational Aspects
436 et seq. (1981).
7 The Ontario Court of Appeal held obiter that s. io of the Bahamian law
was not intended to apply to foreign nationals testifying in foreign courts
as there exist two well-established presumptions: (j), that an offence creating section is not intended by Parliament to cover conduct outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Crown and (2), that a statute will not be construed
as applying to foreigners in respect of acts done by them abroad. The court
cited Lord Scarman in Air India v. Wiggins, [1980] 2 All E.R. 593, at 597.
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and its capacity to enforce a rule of law. The Ontario Court of
Appeal also invoked the general principle of private international
law that Canadian courts will not recognize and enforce foreign
laws whether or not they are intended to have a territorial or extraterritorial effect when they conflict with our fundamental ideas or
institutions, in other words, when they are contrary to the fundamental public policy of Canada.' In the immediate case, the fundamental public policy was the right of the citizens and the courts
to obtain relevant evidence from every person competent to give
it. The Court of Appeal considered Frischke et al. v. Royal Bank
of Canada et al.,"° one of its earlier decisions, where the plaintiff brought a civil action against his daughter and her husband
charging that they had fraudulently converted funds belonging to
him. To support his claim, he sought records from the Panamanian
branch of the Royal Bank of Canada. The trial judge ordered the
bank to obtain the information in question from the employees of
that branch although compliance would be against Panamanian
banking and secrecy laws as they affect banking and banking accounts in that state. The Court of Appeal reversed this order and
held that since "[ain Ontario court would not order a person here to
break our laws; we should not make an order that would require
someone to compel another person in that jurisdiction to break the
laws of that state. We respect those laws."'
In response to a submission made by the petitioner that the Court
of Appeal should balance the interests of the forum including necessary urgency in tracing funds, as against the unlikely event that a
breach of the foreign law would bring heavy penalties or punishment, that court declined to speculate on how the matter would be
regarded in Panama and said:

We note that there is a Court in that jurisdiction that has power to
authorize the production of the information requested, and perhaps an
8 See Restatement of the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United

States (1965), s. 6, hereinafter referred to as Restatement Second.
i
9 Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1986), para. 9 . See also
InhibiLaw
International
Private
Some
Law:
of
Foreign
"Rejection
Carter,
tions" (1984) 55 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. iii, at 122 et seq.
7 O.R. (2d) 388, 8 D.L.R. (3d) 393.
10 (1977),
( 1977), 17 O.R. (2d), at 399. The Court of Appeal quoted with approval
Lord Justice Scrutton, who in a different context had said: "this country
should not in my opinion assist or sanction the breach of the laws of other
independent states (Ralli Bros. v. Compania Naviera Sota Y Aznar, [I92O]
2 K.B. 287, at 304 (C.A.)).

Notes and Comments
application should be made to that tribunal rather than circumvent its
authority. In no case between private interests to which we have been
referred has an order such as that in question been upheld. Ings et al.
v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, a case in the United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit, is of persuasive value dealing with comparable
issues. The judgment concludes with a statement which is apt where
it was said that upon fundamental principles of international comity
our courts dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take
such action as may well cause a violation of the laws of a friendly
neighbour or at least an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures:
see also Re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 61 1.12
In R. v. Spencer, the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that
Frischke could be distinguished as the facts were different. Unlike
Frischke, which involved information located in Panamato be produced in Canada in violation of Panamanian law, in Spencer the
witness was a resident Canadian citizen testifying in Canada. He
was not ordered to produce records from the bank's branch in the
Bahamas in violation of the law of that state but simply to rely on
his memory. To give effect to the Bahamian law in these circumstances would be to recognize that it had an extraterritorial effect.
The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada were not
prepared to protect foreign bank secrecy at all costs. Where the
evidence is located in the forum, the subpoena must be honoured.
Where it is located in a state that prohibits disclosure the subpoena
must be set aside.
The Court of Appeal also relied upon an American case where
the court had said:
No principle of accommodation requires the United States to seal the
lips of American citizens testifying to facts within their knowledge
concerning activities of other Americans in a foreign country as part
of a scheme to violate American law, simply because that country
12

Ibid., at 399-400. See also Re MacDonald and Briant (1982), 35 O.R. (2d)
161, at 162 (M), where the witness refused to answer any questions regarding Mr. Briant's affairs on the ground that, as a resident of the Bahamas,
he was subject to the laws of the Bahamas prohibiting such disclosure. The
court held that "the legislation enacted by the Parliament of the Bahamas
has been shown to be applicable to the facts of this case and, on the authority of Frischke ... that privilege is one which ought to be recognized
by the Court." In Foseco International Ltd. v. Bimac Canada (198o), 51
C.P.R. (2d) 51 (F.C.T.D.), the plaintiffs in a patent infringement suit
sought an order to protect confidential information in a form corresponding
to an order in a companion U.S. case. Walsh, J. held that the terms of the
American order should be followed: "If this were not so, this Court would
be in a position of permitting the parties here to violate the laws of another
country" (at 55)-

Annuaire canadien de Droit international1985
chooses to throw a veil of secrecy around bank accounts except insofar
as their courts may see fit to lift it.'s
Much emphasis seems to have been given to the situs of the requested documents or information. This should not be the case as
the situs may be insignificant when compared with the respective
states' identifiable interests. The test should be control of the information, not its situs. This was recognized by an American court
that stated:
The fact that a corporation's records and documents are physically
located beyond the confines of the United States does not excuse it
from producing them if they are in its possession and the court has
jurisdiction of the corporation. The test is control, not location of the
records. 4
The Frischke and the Spencer cases indicate that Canadian courts
will not punish resident Canadian citizens or non-resident foreign
nationals in Canada for complying outside Canada with the laws of
foreign states properly applicable to matters within their territory,
as it would be unfair to place such persons, especially non-party
litigants, in a position that whatever they do subjects them to sanctions in Canada or in a foreign state.
Where two states issue directly conflicting commands, international law, starting from the basic notions of sovereignty and equality
of states, accords primacy to the commands taken within their respective territories. This statement explains the divergent decisions
reached in Frischke and Spencer. In Frischke the Ontario Court of
Appeal could not require the bank to do an act (obtaining records)
in Panama which was prohibited there. On the other hand in
Spencer, the act (giving information based on memory) was to be
done in Canadawhere it was not prohibited. It might have been different if Mr. Spencer had been asked to produce records which were
physically located in the Bahamas. The Panamanian and Bahamian
13 United States v. Frank et al., 494 F.2d 145, at 156-57 (2nd Cir. 1974).

14

See also In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404,
at 410 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 940, 97 S. Ct. 354, 6o L.Ed. 2d
309 (1976): "In a world where commercial transactions are international
in scope, conflicts are inevitable. Courts and legislatures should take every
reasonable precaution to avoid placing individuals in the situation [the
Bank] finds [it]self. Yet, this court simply cannot acquiesce in the proposition that United States criminal investigations must be thwarted whenever
there is conflict with the interest of other states."
Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to CanadianInternational
Paper Company, 72 F. Supp. 1013, at p. 1020 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).

Notes and Comments
laws seek to control conduct within their territory, not conduct
abroad. Yet in the United States of America two recent cases involving a Canadian bank seem to have practically eliminated the defence
of foreign state compulsion except where the enforcement of American antitrust laws is involved. 5
In In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States of America v.
The Bank of Nova Scotia," the federal Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed a District Court order holding the Bank
of Nova Scotia in civil contempt for failing to comply with an order
of that court enforcing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. A
United States federal grand jury conducting a tax and narcotics
investigation issued a subpoena to the bank which was served in
1981 on its Miami office, calling for the production of certain bank
records maintained at its branch offices in Nassau, the Bahamas,
and Antigua in the Antilles' relating to the bank accounts of one of
its customers. The Bank of Nova Scotia's Miami agent appeared
before the grand jury and formally declined to produce the documents in question, in part on the ground that compliance with the
subpoena without the customer's consent or an order of a Bahamian
court would violate Bahamian bank secrecy laws.' He also contended that alternative methods were available to obtain these documents that would not require the bank to violate foreign laws.'
Leaving aside American constitutional law issues,2" let us consider
one of the bank's most important contentions, that comity between
For a short summary of the situation in the United States of America, see
Castel, "The Extraterritorial Effects of Antitrust Laws" (1981), 179 Recueil
des Cours is, at 58.
16 691 F.2d 1384 (xith Cir. 1982), cert. den. sub nom. Bank of Nova Scotia
v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3o86, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1348 (1983). For a comment
see Caggiano (1983), 7 Suffolk Trans. L.J. 565.
17 No documents were found at the Antigua branch. Accordingly the court
dealt with documents in the Bahamas only.
is See supra note 2.
15

19 Apparently the U.S. government could have obtained an order of judicial
assistance from the Supreme Court of the Bahamas allowing disclosure by
the Nassau branch only if the subject matter of the grand jury investigation
was a crime under Bahamian law and not solely criminal under United
States tax laws.
2o Such as due process. See Socidt Internationale pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Cornmercialesv. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S. Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed. 2d
1255 (1958). The Court of Appeals held that the bank had failed to bring
itself within the holding of that case. See also Browne, "Extraterritorial
Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith" (1983), 83 Col. L. Rev. 1320.
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states precluded the enforcement of the subpoena. In rejecting
this contention the Court of Appeals relied on In Grand Jury
Proceedings, United States v. Field,1 where contempt penalties imposed by the District Court were upheld by the Court of Appeals
against a non-resident alien officer of a bank located in the Grand
Cayman Island, British West Indies. Having been subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury investigating the use of foreign banks in
evading tax enforcement while present in the United States, he
refused to answer the questions put to him by the grand jury concerning his bank and its clients on the ground that by testifying he
would subject himself to criminal penalties in his country of residence. Except for the fact that the bank officer was still resident
in the Grand Cayman Island, the facts of the case resemble those in
Spencer. In the Bank of Nova Scotia case, the Court of Appeals
was of the opinion that the situation before it was similar to that in
Field in all material respects. Thus, the balancing of competing
interests test of section 40 of the Restatement Second2 " which was
applied in Field yielded identical results here because the vital role
of a grand jury's investigative function to the American system of
jurisprudence and the crucial importance of the collection of revenue
to the financial integrity of the United States outweighed the
Bahamian interest in the right of privacy of banking transactions.
The court rejected all the grounds advanced by the bank to distinguish Field from the immediate case. The fact that in Field the
bank itself and not just its customers were under investigation by the
grand jury was deemed to be irrelevant as in both cases the concern
21
22

Supra note 13.
S. 40 provides:
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the
part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider,
in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in
the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
that state.

Notes and Comments
was the proliferation of foreign secret bank accounts utilized by
Americans to evade income taxes and conceal crimes. The bank's
argument that the present situation was different because documentary evidence was requested rather than testimonial evidence as
in Field was also rejected, quite correctly, on the ground that irrespective of the form of the requested information, its effect on the
competing state interests would be the same. The last argument
advanced by the bank for distinguishing Field, that the instant
subpoena called for the disclosure of information located in a foreign
state instead of the United States, was also dismissed since the disclosure would occur in the United States and the affront to the
Bahamas would be the same no matter where the information was
originally located. In other words, the interest of the Bahamas in
preserving the secrecy of the bank records was impinged by the
fact of the disclosure itself. This is a valid argument only if the
Bahamian law applies extraterritorially. If one considers the situation in Frischke, Spencer, and Bank of Nova Scotia, one must admit
that the distinctions sought to be made with respect to the location
of the information pertain more to semantics than logic and realism.
Actually, it does not matter where the information is located or
where it is disclosed. The form of the disclosure is equally unimportant. What is important is the disclosure. That, as the Court of
Appeals said, is the affront to the state that wishes to preserve the
secrecy of bank accounts. The violation of that state's laws takes
place when the information is disclosed at home or abroad in any
manner.
In the Bank of Nova Scotia case, the Court of Appeals did not
seem to be inclined to consider alternative methods for obtaining the
requested information in order to respect the sovereignty of a friendly
foreign state because of the possible delays and expenses involved
and the uncertain likelihood of success in obtaining an order for
judicial assistance in the Bahamas. Practical reasons were improperly
advanced in order to avoid complying with the comity of nations.
The real basis for rejecting alternative methods of compliance was
that they would not have afforded due deference to United States
interests. Why should the United States government ask the courts
of the Bahamas to be allowed to do something lawful under American law! If that is the case, why has the United States entered into
special international agreements that provide for judicial assistance?
The second case, In Re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of
Nova Scotia, United States of America v. The Bank of Nova
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Scotia,2" also involved civil contempt proceedings for the failure by
the bank to comply with a grand jury subpoena served in 1983 on
its Miami office requesting it to produce financial records pertaining
to narcotics investigation suspects, held by its branches in the
Bahamas, Cayman Islands, and Antigua. 4 In an effort to comply
with the subpoena, the bank filed a petition before the Grand Court
of the Cayman Islands for permission to produce the records. This
petition was denied and the bank specifically ordered not to produce them. Later on, however, the Governor of the Islands, acting
in conformity with the provisions of the confidentiality statute, authorized their disclosure." The main issue was whether the bank had
failed to exercise good faith in its efforts to comply with the subpoena. The bank was found in contempt by the District Court and
its decision was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals after an
initial appeal to that court had resulted in a remand.2"
In finding against the bank the Court of Appeals reviewed the
way in which the District Court had balanced the several factors
enumerated in section 40 of the Restatement Second."7 Clearly, the
United States' interest in stemming the narcotics trade outweighed
the Cayman Islands' interest in preserving bank secrecy as vital to
the expansion of its principal industry. However, even there, it is
recognized that bank secrecy should not be used to encourage or
foster criminal activities. Thus, the policy of the Cayman Islands
was held to be consistent with that of the United States.2" Since in
23 740 F.2d 817 (iith Cir. 1984),

after remand 722 F.2d 657 (iith Cir.
1983), cert. den. 105 S. Ct. 778 (1985). For a comment see Paikin, "Bank
of Nova Scotia II: The American Subpoena and the Multinational Enterprise" (1984), 9 Can. B.L.J. 497.
24 As no documents existed at its Antigua branch and the Bahamas authorized
the bank to release the documents found there, only the Grand Cayman
documents were at issue in this case.
25 S. 3A( )-(2), Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law 1976 (Law
16 of 1976) as am. in 1979 (Law 26 of 1979). This action and subsequent
disclosure by the bank did not exonerate it from liability for past contempt.
28 Supra note 23. The fact that the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands had
ordered the bank not to produce the documents or disclose the information
did not afford a valid defence to the bad faith charge. Cf. Socilt Internationale pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, supra
note 20.
27 Supra note 22.

28 The law of the Cayman Islands contains many exceptions. In Re Confidential
Relationships (Preservation) Law, United States v. Carver (Jamaica Ct.
App. 1982), the court said:

Notes and Comments
the present case American citizens were the object of the investigation, United States courts had a legitimate basis for examining their
financial records.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the disclosure and
production of the records would take place in the United States and
that their situs was not a decisive factor as contended by the Canadian government in its brief amicus curiae. 9 Furthermore, the
Canadian nationality of the Bank of Nova Scotia was not important
in view of its pervasive presence in the United States. By doing business there and in other foreign states, the bank had accepted the
incident risk of occasional inconsistent governmental actions."0 The
fact that a person may be held criminally liable for acts that are
legal where performed is not unusual. This type of liability can be
justified under the passive personality principle or the protective
principle." The Court of Appeals also was of the opinion that the
single Convention on Narcotic Drugs3" which binds the United
States and the Cayman Islands does not contain exclusive means for
the exchange of information between the contracting parties that
should have been followed. It could not impair the investigatory
powers granted to the grand jury under United States law. The
Convention was adopted to aid, not to hinder, the enforcement of
drug-trafficking laws. Therefore, it did not require greater deference
to the law of the Cayman Islands than that recognized in the balancing test found in the Restatement Second.
[TIhere is nothing in the statute to suggest that it is the public policy
of the Cayman Islands to permit a person to launder the proceeds of
crime in the Cayman Islands, secure from detection and punishment.
29 See also Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Oct. 23, 1984, pp. 4-7.
30 The Court of Appeals cited First National City Bank of New York v.
InternationalRevenue Service, 271 F.2d 616, at 62o (2nd Cir. 1959), cert.
den. 361 U.S. 948, 80 S. Ct. 402, 4 L.Ed. 2d 38! (i96o), where the Court
of Appeal said:
If the Bank cannot, as it were, serve two masters and comply with the
lawful requirements both of the United States and Panama, perhaps
it should surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges received
therefrom.
31 For an analysis of these principles as bases for the exercise of jurisdiction see
Williams and Castel, op. cit. note 6, at 126-36.
32 (i96i), 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204, ratified by the
United States in 1967, as am. by Protocol of Mar. 25, 1972, ratified by the
United States in 1975, 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. 8118. Canada is also a
party to this Convention.
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The two Bank of Nova Scotia cases clearly show that in the
United States, the courts have moved from deference to comity to
the paramount importance of American law enforcement."
Today section 40 of the Restatement Second seems to have little
restraining effect on the courts. A subsequent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit where the competing
state interests were balanced in favour of the foreign state is not
sufficient to point to a new direction.' 4 Actually this case can be
reconciled with the Bank of Nova Scotia cases as the disclosure
would have been initiated in Greece, Greek nationals would have
participated in the release of information, and a heavy penalty would
have been imposed on them. However, the Court of Appeals failed
to identify properly the nature of Greek interests. It was concerned
primarily in avoiding criminal sanctions. If the Greek law had imposed lesser penalties, the court's balancing analysis might have
produced a different result.
The Restatement Second test is clearly deficient in its treatment
of vital national interests as it provides no meaningful guidelines
for balancing conflicting national interests and does not require that
these interests be evaluated according to their particular importance
in each case. The courts should be forced to examine the policies
that underlie the foreign state's interests in enacting the law under
review."
The availability of viable alternatives to obtain the information
sought should also be considered as a matter of course when balancing competing interests. This is recognized by section 420(2) (a) of
33 For a survey see Onkelinx, "Conflict of International Jurisdiction: Ordering

the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law of the Situs" (1969),
64 Northwestern U.L. Rev. 487; Blejec, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S.
Courts Regarding the Use of Supoenas Duces Tecum to Obtain Discovery
in Transnational Litigation: The Search for a Limiting Principle" (1984),
16 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1135; Olsen, "Discovery in Federal Criminal
Investigations" (1984), 16 J. Int'l L. & Pol. 999.
34 United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341

( 7 th Cir.
1983). The court held that compliance with an Internal Revenue Service
summons to produce records located at the Athens branch of the First
National Bank of Chicago was not required because the persons who could
make the records available would be subject to criminal prosecution under
Greek law. For a comment see Hight, "United States v. First National Bank
of Chicago: Limiting American Extraterritorial Authority to Order the
Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law" (1983), 33 Depaul
L. Rev. 183.
35 For an analysis of governmental interests and policies in a different context,
see Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963).
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the Draft Restatement Second (Revised) which provides that: "If
disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited by a law or regulation of the state in which the information
or prospective witness is located... (a) the person to whom the
order is directed may be required by the court to make a good faith
effort to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the
information available."
It is interesting to note that both in Canada and the United States
when criminal activities are involved the vital interests of the investigating or prosecuting forum state will prevail. One cannot expect
Canadian or American courts to be objective when balancing the
vital interests of the competing states where one of these states is
their own. Neither judicial comity nor the Restatement Second
seems to provide an acceptable solution. Section 403 of the Draft
Restatement Second (Revised),3" which deals with the limitations
36

403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe
(i) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under 402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to the
activities, relations, status, or interests of persons or things having connections with another state or states when the exercise of such jurisdiction
is unreasonable.
(2)
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or unreasonable
is judged by evaluating all the relevant factors, including, where appropriate,
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating
state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
regulating state:
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that inight be protected or
hurt by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international
political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
(3) When more than one state has a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by two or more
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on jurisdiction to prescribe and uses as a criterion the reasonableness
of the exercise of jurisdiction, will not make things easier as the
courts will still have to evaluate all relevant factors including their
own state interests. True comity implies self-restraint and accommodation of the interests of other states based on reciprocity, but this
is difficult to achieve as our courts are not equipped to ascertain
such interests. Deference seems to be a one-way street as in most
cases it means deference to the interests of the state whose courts
are doing the evaluation. Foreign government compulsion should
certainly be a valid defence to contempt sanctions where the witness
is not a target of the investigation and has made a serious effort to
comply with the discovery order.
The Bank of Nova Scotia cases should not be read as holding
that all of the bank's Canadian and foreign activities and operations
were subject to the jurisdiction of the federal grand jury and federal
courts. Since the bank was conducting some of its banking operations through a branch in Miami which was a conduit for its international banking business, it was properly subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States with respect to these operations. Jurisdiction
was based on the fact that the bank had a fixed place of business in
Florida where it conducted banking operations that were material
to the grand jury investigation. Thus, it cannot be said that the
Bank of Nova Scotia was a totally disinterested third party. The
states are in conflict, each state is expected to evaluate its own as well as
the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction in light of all the relevant factors, including those set out in Subsection (2); and to defer to
the other state if that state's interest is greater.
See also s. 436 [419]
436 [419]. Foreign Government Compulsion
(i) A person generally may not be required by a state
(a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that
state or by the law of the state of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by the
law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a national.
(2) A person of foreign nationality may generally be required by a state
(a) to do an act in that state even if it is prohibited by the law of the
state of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in that state even if it is required by
the law of the state of which he is a national.
This section applies the principle of s. 403(3). See also Rosenthal and
Yale-Loehr, "Two Cheers for the ALI Restatement's Provisions on Foreign
Discovery" (1983), 16 J. of Int'l L. & Pol. 1075; Robinson, "Compelling
Discovery and Evidence in International Litigation," [1984] Int'l L. 533.
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bank ought to have known that its decision to operate in the United
States would eventually involve it in a conflict of this nature. To
avoid such a situation the bank could have decided to conduct business in one state only. It could also have obtained secrecy waivers
from its customers although that would have destroyed the bank's
raison d'8tre for operating in Florida and in the Caribbean region.
It could be argued that by doing business in Florida through an
agency or a branch, the Canadian company subjected itself to
United States jurisdiction since it had total control over its Miami
agency. However, reaching the foreign parent through a local
wholly-owned subsidiary is a procedure that is not free from
controversy."t
CANADIAN RESPONSES

The position of American courts with respect to non-disclosure
laws has been widely criticized as another example of the extraterritorial application of the laws of the United States. In response,
Canada has enacted blocking statutes designed to prevent disclosure
of information to foreign courts and investigative bodies in certain
circumstances. For instance, section 3(I) (a) and (c) of the Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act38 provides that the Attorney General
of Canada may by order prohibit or restrict the production "before
or the disclosure or identification to, or for the purposes of a foreign
tribunal or records that, at any time while the order is in force, are
in Canada or are in the possession or under the control of a Canadian citizen or a person resident in Canada" or "the giving by a
person, at a time when he is a Canadian citizen or a resident of
37 See In Re Electric & Musical Industries Ltd., 155 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); cf. Matter of Arawak Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd., 489 F. Supp.
x62 (E.D.N.Y. 198o), where it was held that jurisdiction could not be

exercised over a foreign company that had no office in the United States,
did not hold itself out as transacting business there and had no significant
property in the forum except a bank account. The United States grand
jury's power could not extend further than that of the court of which it was
an arm. In Canada see Bowlen v. R. (No. 2), [1978] s. F.C. 798, 5 C.P.C.
215 (F.C.T.D.), where the court held that Federal Court Rule 464(0)
which deals with the production of documents in the possession of a person
not a party to the action does not cover the production of documents within
the possession of and representing the property of a partially controlled or
even a wholly-owned subsidiary company of the company or person to whom
the court's order is directed. The court refused to pierce the corporate veil.
38 S.C. 1984-85, c. 49. See also Business Records Protection Act, R.S.O., 198o,
c. 56 and Business Concerns Records Act, L.R.Q. 1977, c. D-s,2.
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Canada, of information before, or for the purposes of, a foreign
tribunal in relation to the contents or identification of, records that,
at any time while the order is in force, are or were in Canada or
under the control of a Canadian citizen or a person resident in
Canada" if doing so has or is likely to affect adversely significant
Canadian interests in relation to international trade or commerce
involving a business carried on in whole or in part in Canada or
otherwise infringe Canadian sovereignty. This section, if it were
invoked by the Attorney General of Canada in a situation similar
to that which existed in the Bank of Nova Scotia cases, would not
be effective when the United States is not seeking evidence in
Canada.
CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

What is the solution? One could adopt the solution proposed by
Mr. Justice Estey in the Spencer case and the Draft Restatement
Second (Revised) and require the person to whom the order is
directed to make an effort in good faith to secure permission from
the foreign authorities to make the information available. However,
this may not always be possible, especially in the case of tax evasion.
Furthermore, to require the courts to consult affected foreign states
before issuing compulsory process may constitute a usurpation of
the functions of the executive branch of the government. Judicial
restraint and deferral, except pursuant to a domestic statute or
an international treaty, is far too unpredictable in the best of
circumstances."
The principle of the sovereign equality of states requires a political
solution based on reciprocity which must go beyond diplomatic
representations and informal arrangements or understandings and
take the form of a treaty4" or other formal intergovernmental
agreement.
S3 For a review of possible solutions in the antitrust field, see Castel, op. cit.

40

supra note 15, at 1o5 et seq. Note that in 1985 a Subpoena Working Group
comprising legal officials of Canada and the United States was created which
provides an informal "early warning" mechanism and forum for consultations
on practical approaches that may avoid the conflicts caused in the Bank of
Nova Scotia case.
Note that in the 1984 Bank of Nova Scotia case the Court of Appeals refused to apply a "Gentleman's Agreement" between the United States and
the Cayman Islands on the ground that it was not a formal intergovernmental
agreement and was not considered binding by the parties. At most it was a
simple understanding as to how informal requests for assistance were to be
channelled between the parties.
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On March 9, 1984, Canada and the United States signed a
Memorandum of Understanding which provides for notification and
consultation in the antitrust field in order to minimize conflicts between the two countries. 4 Paragraph 8 of this Understanding is of
particular interest as it deals with information to be obtained from
private persons:
(i) Either Party may utilize whatever means it considers necessary to
obtain for antitrust investigations and proceedings relevant information
located in its own territory, whether or not an entity from which information is sought has a parent or subsidiary in the territory of the other.
(2)
Where, in the opinion of the investigating Party, information is
adequately available from sources within its territory, that Party will,
in the first instance, attempt to obtain such information from those
sources before seeking it from the territory of the other Party.
(3) If a Party intends to seek information located in the territory of
the other Party, it will attempt to obtain the information by voluntary
means in the first instance, unless it concludes that in the specific circumstances compulsory process should be used. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, concern that evidence might
otherwise be destroyed or removed or that voluntary compliance would
not be forthcoming. If the Party in whose territory the information is
located requests consultations, the process normally will not be issued
until there has been a reasonable opportunity for consultation. If
exceptional circumstances require that the process be issued before
there has been an opportunity for requested consultation, the Party
that issued the process will not seek to enforce compliance until a
reasonable period for consultation, if requested, has elapsed.
(4) When requests for information located in the territory of the other
are made, they will be framed as narrowly and specifically as possible
in order to minimize the financial and administrative burden on the
recipient.
(5) After notification and consultation or waiver thereof, and subject to paragraph 5, voluntary in-person interviews with private
persons may generally be conducted in the territory of the other Party.
Such Party retains the right to attach any conditions to the conduct
of an interview that it deems appropriate, including the attendance
of its officials at such interviews.
This Understanding is not a formal agreement. It simply reiterates
in a more elaborate form the Recommendation of September 25,
41 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Canada and
the Government of the United States of America as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust
Laws, Mar. 9, 1984 (984), 23 Int'l Leg. Mat. 275.
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1979 of the Council of the OECD42 4on
Notification and Consulta3

tion on Restrictive Business Practices.
In the case of civil and commercial actions, the 1970 Hague Convention on the taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters to which the United States is a party" cannot be used by
our courts since Canada has not yet signed and ratified it but is
planning to do so as soon as the provinces have passed the necessary
implementing legislation. Even if it were in force between the two
countries, it may not be effective in certain cases as a letter of request
cannot be used to obtain evidence which is not intended for use in
judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated." Furthermore,
according to Article 23, "A contracting State may at the time of
signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute
Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries." To date,
twelve of the sixteen signatory states have made such a declaration.
Therefore, it would be difficult if not impossible to resort to the
procedure contemplated by the Convention for pre-trial discovery
and an order would not be made unless there was already an action
pending before the courts of the requesting state.
In 1977 the United States and Canada signed an Agreement
entitled Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of
Justice in Connection with the Boeing Company Matter. 6 The
Agreement provided in part that:
Upon request, the parties shall use their best efforts to make available to each other relevant and material information, such as statements, depositions, documents, business records, correspondence or
other materials, available to them concerning alleged illicit acts pertaining to the sales activities in Canada of the Boeing Company and
its subsidiaries or affiliates.
(3) Such information shall be used exclusively for purposes of investi2.

Canada and the United States are members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. See Convention on the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 14, 1g6o, entered into force
Sept. 30, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. 4891, 888 U.N.T.S. 179.
43 C. (79) 154 Final.
42

44 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. 744, 28 U.S.C.A. 1781, 658 U.N.T.S. x63. For a

45

case applying the Convention see Graco Inc. v. Kremlin Inc. and SKM S.A.
(985), 8 European Coin. Cas. 195 (U.S. D.C., N.D. Ill. E.D.). The case
also involved a foreign blocking statute.
Art. i. Also arts. ii, 12.

46

Mar. 15, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 2463, T.I.A.S. 8567. No longer in force.
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gation conducted by agencies with law enforcement responsibilities
and in ensuing criminal, civil and administrative proceedings, hereinafter referred to as "legal proceedings."
5. Information made available pursuant to these procedures may be
used freely in ensuing legal proceedings in the requesting state in which
an agency of the requesting state having law enforcement responsibilities is a party, and the parties shall use their best efforts to furnish
the information for purposes of such legal proceedings in such form
as to render it admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence in existence
in the requesting state, including, but not limited to, certifications,
authentications, and such other assistance as may be necessary to provide the foundation for the admissibility of evidence.
6. The parties shall give advance notice and afford an opportunity
for consultation prior to the use, within the meaning of paragraph 5,
of any information made available pursuant to these procedures.
8. The parties shall use their best efforts to assist in the expeditious
execution of letters rogatory issued by the judicial authorities of their
respective countries in connection with any legal proceedings which
may ensue in their respective countries.
9. The assistance to be rendered to a requesting state shall not be
required to extend to such acts by the authorities of the requested
state as might result in the immunization of any person from prosecution in the requested state.
Io. All actions to be taken by a requested state will be performed subject to all limitations imposed by the domestic law of the country
concerned. Execution of a request for assistance may be postponed or
denied if execution would interfere with ongoing investigations or legal
proceedings, criminal, civil and administrative, in the requested state.
In the criminal field, the United States and Canada are parties to
several multilateral conventions that contain specific provisions for
the transmission of letters of request relating to the offences listed
in these conventions.4 7
47

E.g., x961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1964 C.T.S. No. 30, 18
U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204, as am. by 1972 Protocol, 26
U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. 8118, art. 35(e). In the Bank of Nova Scotia cases,
supra note 23, mention was made of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of
America concerning the Cayman Islands and Matters Connected with,
Arising from, Related to or Resulting from any Narcotics Activity Referred
in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs x96x, as amended by the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 signed at
London on July 26, 1984 (1985), 24 Int'l Leg. Mat. ir o. On Aug. 27,
1984, legislation was passed in the Cayman Islands which brought into effect
this Agreement: Narcotic Drugs (Evidence) (United States of America)
Law, 1984, Law 17 of 1984, Extraordinary Gazette, Aug. 29, 1984, Supplement No. 4 (1984), 24 Int'l Leg. Mat. 937.
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The OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises has also been concerned with conflicting requirements imposed on multinational enterprises and on May i8,
1984, the Council of this organization agreed to strengthen bilateral
and multilateral co-operation in intergovernmental conflicts involving multilateral enterprises.48 To this end, the ministers reviewed the
1976 Declaration and Guidelines on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, and in particular endorsed a series of
recommendations concerning methods to ameliorate conflicting requirements imposed on multinational enterprises by various jurisdictions. The pertinent part of these recommendations states:
27.

In contemplating new legislation, action under existing legislation

or other exercise of jurisdiction which may conflict with the legal
requirements or established policies of another Member country and

lead to conflicting requirements being imposed on multinational enterprises, the Member countries concerned should:
(i) Have regard to relevant principles of international law;
(ii) Endeavour to avoid or minimize such conflicts and the prob-

lems to which they give rise by following an approach of moderation
and restraint, respecting and accommodating the interests of other
Member countries;
(iii) Take fully into account the sovereignty and legitimate economic, law enforcement and other interests of other Member

countries...
28. Member countries should endeavour to promote co-operation as

an alternative to unilateral action to avoid or minimise conflicting
requirements and problems arising therefrom. Member countries should
to arrive at mutually
on request consult one another and 4endeavour
9

acceptable solutions to such problems.

This type of co-operation and consultation has received the support
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, PRESS/A (84)28,
para. 36 (May 18, 1984).
49 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: The 1984 Review of the 1976
Declaration and Decision 26 (1984).
In the banking field the Basle Concordat, formally known as Principles for
the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments (1975 rev. 1983) (see
(1983), 12 Int'l Monetary Fund Survey 201), to which the central banks
of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States are parties, has established the framework of an international supervisory system of transnational banking operations. Under this
Concordat, gaps in regulations are to be filled by either host or home state,
and overlaps are to be worked out between the regulatory authorities of the
two states having jurisdiction so as to avoid conflicts and uncertainty.

48
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of Canadian officials whenever the actions of one state are likely to
affect another adversely."0 To be fully effective such co-operation
and consultation should take the form of a comprehensive formal
mutual assistance agreement.
This was done on March 18, 1985, when Canada and the United
States signed a Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters."' According to Article 2, the parties shall provide mutual
legal assistance in all matters relating to the investigation, prosecution, and suppression of offences. Such assistance shall include, inter
alia, taking the evidence of persons, providing documents and
records, and executing requests for searches and seizures. A party
seeking to obtain documents or records located in the territory of
the other party shall request assistance in accordance with the provisions of the treaty except as otherwise agreed pursuant to other
agreements, arrangements, or practices. Where denial of a request or
delay in its execution may jeopardize the successful completion of
an investigation or prosecution, the parties shall promptly consult,
at the instance of either party, to consider alternative means of
assistance.52 The requested state may deny assistance to the extent
that execution of the request is contrary to its public interest.53 This
provision resembles that found in the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.5
Thus, if the Canadian government has decided that it is in its public
interest to prevent the disclosure of certain evidence pursuant to the
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act,"5 co-operation will not take
place.
The treaty indicates to whom and how requests shall be made.5"
50 April and Fried, "Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in Transnational

Criminal Litigation: A Canadian View" (1984), 16 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. &
Pol. 961, at 968.
51 Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
signed at Quebec City on Mar. 18, 1985, not yet in force (1985), 24 Int'l
Leg. Mat. ro92. The offences contemplated by the Treaty are found in
Article i and in the Annex. See also United States-Switzerland Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2o9,
T.I.A.S. 8302 entered into force Jan. 23, 1977, and 1982 Memorandum of
Understanding.
52 Art. 4.
53 Art- 5.1 (b).
54

Supra note 44, art. 12(b).

55 Supra note 38.
56 Art. 6.
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The courts of the requested state shall have jurisdiction to issue
subpoenas, search warrants, or other orders necessary to execute the
request.5 7 In all cases the request shall be executed in the requested
state only to the extent not prohibited by its law. Thus, it will not
be executed if it involves violating the law of the requested state.5"
The requesting state shall not disclose or use information or
evidence furnished for purposes other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the Central Authority of the
requested state.5" Article 12 makes it quite clear that a person requested to testify and produce documents, records, or other articles
in the requested state may be compelled to do so only in accordance
with the requirements of the law of the requested state.
Finally, it should be noted that the Central Authority of either
party shall notify the Central Authority of the other party of proceeds of crime believed to be located in the territory of the other
party (e.g., local bank accounts)."o The parties shall also assist each
other to the extent permitted by their respective laws in proceedings
related to the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime and the collection
of fines imposed as a sentence in a criminal prosecution. 1 This
means that Canadian courts must abandon the rule that they will
not recognize and enforce United States criminal laws and judgments imposing a monetary penalty. 2 The banks will also have to
co-operate with the Central Authorities in order to return money
that has been laundered through their agencies.
This treaty, which contains many other important provisions not
relevant to this note, represents the most comprehensive approach to
legal assistance in criminal matters and should serve as a model for
other states. It respects the principle of sovereign equality of states as
it recognizes the interests of both parties in a very realistic fashion.
It also leaves open other available avenues for international judicial
assistance. This is international comity at its best. Once proclaimed
in force, the treaty should eliminate frictions between Canada and
57 Art. 7.
5

Ibid.

59 Art. 9. "Central Authority" means for Canada the Minister of Justice or
officials designated by him and for the United States of America, the Attorney General or officials designated by him (Art. i).
60 Art. 17.
61

Ibid.

62

See Castel, op. cit. supra note 9, para. 88.
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the United States and promote full and effective co-operation in
the fight against ever mounting transnational criminality. However,
it is doubtful that it will solve the problems that arose in the Bank
of Nova Scotia cases as these are intractable in the absence of similar treaty provisions binding all the states where the requested information is located. Under the Canada-United States treaty, a federal
grand jury could obtain documents located in Canada but it could
not obtain documents located in another foreign state, such as the
Bahamas, unless the provisions of the treaty were given extraterritorial effect and were applied by Canadian courts to Canadian
nationals such as the Bank of Nova Scotia when operating outside
Canada. This is particularly important when the United States or
Canada is attempting to recover the proceeds of crimes deposited in
a foreign branch of one of its banks.
It is comforting to see that in recent years, at least on the federal
level, Canada has taken some very important and constructive steps
in the area of international legal assistance. The provinces should
heed this new trend and, in civil and commercial matters, implement
the provisions of the 197o Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. 3 Full interna63 Supra note 44. Note that Canada is bound by i9 treaties, mainly with Euro-

pean states regarding Legal Proceedings in Civil and Commercial Matters,
which provide for the transmission and the service of documents as well as
the execution of letters of request:
Canada Treaty Series, 1935, No. 16
Austria
Canada Treaty Series, 1928, No. 16
Belgium
Canada Treaty Series, 1928, No. 17
Czechoslovakia
Canada Treaty Series, 1936, No. 4
Denmark
Canada Treaty Series, 1936, No. 5
Finland
Canada Treaty Series, 1928, No. 15
France
Canada Treaty Series, 1935, No. Ti
Germany
Canada Treaty Series, 1938, No. i i
Greece
Canada Treaty Series, 1939, No. 6
Hungary
Canada Treaty Series, 1938, No. 12
Iraq
Canada Treaty Series, 1935, No. 14
Italy
Canada Treaty Series, 1936, No. 2
Netherlands
Canada Treaty Series, 1935, No. 15
Norway
Canada Treaty Series, 1935, No. 18
Poland
Canada Treaty Series, 1935, No. 17
Portugal
Canada Treaty Series, 1935, No. 12
Spain
Canada Treaty Series, 1935, No. 13
Sweden
Canada Treaty Series, 1935, No. 19
Turkey
Canada Treaty Series, 1939, No. 4
Yugoslavia
In Quebec, see also 1977 Entente between Quebec and France Regarding
Judicial Mutual Aid in Civil, Commercial and Administrative Matters, L.Q.
1978, c. 20.
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tional legal assistance in civil, commercial, and criminal matters is
the only practical way in which true justice can be extended to all.
J.-G. CASTEL
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto
Most provinces have adopted an Interprovincial Subpoena Act which
facilitates the enforcement of a subpoena or other document from a court
outside the province requiring a person to attend as a witness. The legislation
does not apply to a subpoena issued with respect to a criminal offence under
an Act of Canada. See, for instance, S.A. 198i, c. I-8.1; R.S.B.C. 1979,
c. 396; S.M. 1975, c. 3; S.N.B. 1979, c. 1-13.1; S.N. 1975-76, No. 33;
O.N.W.T. 1976 (2nd), c. 2; R.S.O. 1980, c. 220; R.S.S. 1978, c. 1-12.1;
O.Y.T. 1981 (ISt), c. 7.

Sommaire

Divulgation forcde des renseignements par un tiers tenu au secret
bancaire selon le droit 6tranger: Ddveloppements rdcents dans les
rapports Canado-americains
La question de l'obtention des preuves a l'itranger en matigre criminelle, civile ou commerciale est un sujet qui a fait couler beaucoup
d'encre ces dernidres annies. Cette itude fait le tour de la question
surtout en ce qui concerne l'entraide judiciaire entre le Canada et les
Atats-Unis d'Amirique. En principe, les tribunaux canadiens ne doivent pas enjoindre une personne a faire un acte qui viole les dispositions d'une loi itrangaresi cet acte doit 9tre fait dans le pays dont la
loi sera violie. Ainsi, on ne peut exiger d'une banque canadienne
qu'elle force les employis d'une de ses agences h l'tranger riviler
les opirations financi~res d'un client de cette agence, ce qui serait
contraire aux dispositions des lois en vigueur dans ce lieu ayant trait
au secret bancaire. Par contre, dans une affaire criminelle, un employi
de banque peut tre contraint t timoigner au Canada concernant
les opirations financiares de l'accusi, car dans ce cas il ne s'agit pas
de produire des documents qui se trouvent h l' tranger, mais simplement de ripondre aux questions qui lui sont posies par le procureur
de la couronne.
L'auteur compare la practique canadienne assez libirale a celle plus
rigide qui est suive aux Attats-Unis d'Amerique, oil le refus de violation du secret bancaire a donni lieu a plusieurs dicisions importantes
concernant une banque canadienne.
Apres avoir passi en revue les diffirents accords internationaux,
l'auteur priconise l'adoption par les provinces canadiennes de la Convention de la Haye de 1970 sur l'obtention des preuves l'4tranger
en matigre civile ou commerciale.
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